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The Long-Run Costs
of Moderate Inflation
By Gregory D. Hess and Charles S. Morris
L
ong-run price stability is generally consid-
ered to be a primary goal of monetary
policymakers in many countries. One rea-
son policymakers care about inflation is that it
can harm economic performance. Numerous
studies of the impact of inflation on economic
performance have focused on whether increases
in inflation reduce economic growth in the long
run (Barro, Fischer 1993, Bruno and Easterly,
and Clark). These studies have found that pro-
longed high inflation does in fact reduce eco-
nomic growth, but they were not able to detect a
significant long-run relationship between real
growth and low or moderate inflation. Because
anti-inflationary policies typically have short-run
costs, such as higher unemployment and slower
economic growth, the results from these studies
may lead people to ask whether such policies are
appropriate when inflation is low or moderate.
It is contended here that anti-inflationary policies
may be appropriate, even if low to moderate long-
run inflation does not reduce long-run growth,
if inflation harms the economy in other ways.
Three potentially harmful consequences of infla-
tion are considered: (1) inflation uncertainty, (2)
real growth variability, and (3) relative price vola-
tility. These consequences are costly because they
reduce economic efficiency-and therefore the
level of economic output-and consumer welfare.
This article discusses the costs of inflation
uncertainty, real growth variability, and relative
price volatility, and examines their empirical
relationship with inflation. The article shows that
inflation uncertainty, real growth variability, and
relative price volatility all tend to rise as long-run
inflation rises from low to moderate levels. As a
result, it is concluded that policymakers may find
it justifiable to pursue anti-inflationary policies
even when inflation is low. 
DOES INFLATION UNCERTAINTY
RISE WITH INFLATION?
One possible consequence of rising inflation is
that inflation uncertainty may also rise. Inflation
uncertainty is costly to an economy because it
can lead to higher real interest rates, which in
turn reduces real economic activity and con-
sumer welfare. However, inflation may not be
associated with greater inflation uncertainty if
inflation is only moderate. This section discusses
the costs of inflation uncertainty and shows that
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inflation uncertainty is higher in countries with
moderate long-run inflation rates than in coun-
tries with low long-run inflation rates.1
Why is inflation uncertainty costly?
To understand how inflation uncertainty raises
real interest rates, it is useful to consider how
nominal interest rates respond to expected price
increases. A simple example involves the pur-
chase of a 1-year Treasury bill. If there were no
uncertainty about inflation, the nominal interest
rate on the bill would equal the sum of the real
return required by investors to purchase the bill
and the expected inflation rate over the 1-year
investment horizon. The real return is the
amount that investors would require in order to
part with their money for a year in the absence
of inflation. With inflation, however, the bills
principal will purchase fewer goods and services
at the end of the year than at the beginning. For
the principal to buy the same amount of goods
and services when the bill matures, the return on
the bill must be boosted by the inflation rate.
Since the interest rate is determined when the bill
is purchased, the interest rate can only incorpo-
rate the expected inflation rate as opposed to the
actual inflation rate.
Accounting for expected inflation still may not
fully insulate investors or borrowers from the risk
of inflation because actual and expected inflation
are rarely equal. If actual inflation turns out to
be greater than expected, then the investors real
return is less than initially anticipated. Con-
versely, if actual inflation is less than expected,
borrowers end up paying more than is necessary
to compensate investors for the loss of purchas-
ing power caused by inflation. Thus, unexpected
inflation-the difference between actual and ex-
pected inflation-leads to a transfer of wealth
between investors and borrowers. Borrowers lose
when inflation is unexpectedly low, while inves-
tors lose when inflation is unexpectedly high.
To compensate investors for the risk of unex-
pected inflation, nominal interest rates also
include an inflation risk premium in addition
to the expected inflation premium. In general,
risk averse investors will hold a risky asset only
if its return is higher than the return on a
comparable, less risky asset. For example, corpo-
rate bonds typically pay higher rates than com-
parable Treasury bonds because corporations can
default on their bonds while a default by the U.S.
Treasury is highly unlikely. The nominal interest
rate on a bond or any other fixed income asset,
then, is the sum of the required real return in the
absence of inflation, expected inflation, and any
premiums required to compensate investors for
the risks associated with the asset. And, one of
those risks is uncertainty about future inflation.
In addition to higher nominal interest rates,
inflation uncertainty may also lead to higher real
interest rates. Real rates are the difference between
nominal rates and expected inflation. To the
extent that inflation uncertainty leads to an
inflation risk premium, the increase in nominal
rates will directly increase real rates. Indeed,
according to one study, the effect of inflation
uncertainty on real rates could be as high as 1.25
percentage points (Campbell).2
Higher real interest rates due to inflation
uncertainty are costly because they reduce eco-
nomic activity and consumer welfare. Economic
activity and consumer welfare are directly affected
because higher real rates reduce spending in
interest-sensitive sectors of the economy, such as
housing, business investment, and consumer dur-
ables. Moreover, if the rise in real rates leads
businesses to substitute labor for capital in the
production process, production efficiency will
fall, leading to a further loss of real output.
While inflation uncertainty may be costly, it
is useful to ask why higher inflation might lead
to greater inflation uncertainty. For example,
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investors might be just as uncertain about future
inflation when there is no inflation as when
inflation is 10 percent. One reason why inflation
and inflation uncertainty may rise together is
that the public could become more uncertain
about the central banks attitude toward infla-
tion when inflation increases (Ball). When
inflation is low, everybody wants to keep it low.
But at higher levels, some analysts believe, central
banks face a short-run tradeoff between inflation
and real growth and unemployment-that is,
lower inflation can be achieved only at the
expense of lower growth and higher unemploy-
ment in the short run. This tradeoff makes it
more difficult to predict the central banks actions
and, ultimately, the future course of inflation.
For example, central bankers who are primarily
concerned with inflation might move immedi-
ately to lower inflation, while those less commit-
ted to controlling inflation might not do so
because it could sacrifice jobs and real growth.
Thus, inflation uncertainty might rise with infla-
tion because the central banks response to infla-
tion becomes less certain when inflation is high.3
Another reason rising inflation might lead to
greater inflation uncertainty is that low inflation
might not be the principal goal of policymakers
(Cukierman and Meltzer). According to this view,
policymakers who care more about preventing
recessions than maintaining low inflation are likely
to adopt policy procedures that make it easier to
stimulate the economy but harder to control
inflation. For example, a country might choose to
target broad monetary aggregates, which by their
nature cannot be closely controlled by the central
bank. Such a procedure, according to Cukierman
and Meltzer, allows policymakers to stimulate the
economy at the expense of higher inflation, while
attributing the rise in inflation to the uncontrolla-
bility of money. To the extent that countries not
committed to low inflation adopt such procedures,
the variability of monetary policy-and therefore
inflation uncertainty-will rise with inflation.
Empirical results
While inflation uncertainty might in theory be
positively related to inflation, the relationship
might not exist empirically. Golob (1993, 1994)
surveyed 21 studies of the relationship between
inflation and inflation uncertainty and found
that 17 of the studies suggested a positive rela-
tionship. In his own study, Golob (1994) also
found that inflation uncertainty rises with infla-
tion. Many of these studies, however, focused on
the short-run relationship between inflation and
inflation uncertainty in individual countries.
Moreover, while others examined inflation and
inflation uncertainty across countries over longer
periods of time, many of these studies compared
only a few countries or have become outdated.
This article addresses these empirical problems
by examining recent data from 47 countries with
low to moderate rates of inflation over long
periods of time.4 The results, as described below,
indicate a strong long-run positive relationship
between inflation and inflation uncertainty.
Chart 1 shows the relationship between infla-
tion and inflation uncertainty for 47 low-to-
moderate inflation countries (top panel), and for
21 industrialized countries (bottom panel). The
long-run inflation rate for each country is mea-
sured on the horizontal axis by the average
growth in the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The
inflation rates are averaged for most countries
over a 33-year period from 1960 to 1992.5 The
average annual inflation rate for every country in
the sample is low to moderateless than 15
percent a year. Inflation uncertainty is measured
on the vertical axis by the standard deviation of
inflation. The standard deviation of inflation
measures the typical difference between a countrys
annual inflation rate and its average inflation rate
over the sample period.6 
The top panel of the chart shows that the long-
run relationship between inflation and inflation
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Source: Authors calculations from the International Financial Statistics.
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uncertainty for the entire sample of countries is
positive and strong. One summary measure of
the relationship between inflation and inflation
uncertainty is the correlation among the data.
For data that are positively related, the correla-
tion coefficient can vary between zero (no relation-
ship) and one (a perfect positive relationship).
The correlation coefficient for the whole sample
of countries is 0.83 and is highly statistically
significantthe probability that there is no cor-
relation is less than 0.1 percent. The solid line
represents the regression of inflation uncertainty
on inflation, which measures the average response
of inflation uncertainty to a change in inflation.
The regression line has a slope of 0.93, indicating
that inflation variability moves almost one-for-
one with inflation across countries.
The bottom panel of Chart 1 shows that the
positive relationship between inflation and infla-
tion uncertainty for industrialized countries is
even stronger. This chart is the same as the top
one except that it includes just 21 countries that
belong to the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD).7 The correla-
tion between inflation and inflation uncertainty
is 0.95 and is also statistically different from zero
at less than the 0.1 percent level. The regression
line shows that inflation variability is less respon-
sive to inflation in the OECD countries than for
the sample as a whole-on average, a one percent-
age point increase in inflation is associated with
a 0.70 percentage point increase in the standard
deviation of inflation.
DOES VARIABILITY OF REAL
GROWTH RISE WITH INFLATION?
A second potential consequence of inflation is
that the growth of real output may become more
variable. More variable real growth reduces the
likelihood that the economy will operate at its full
potential, reducing consumer welfare and economic
efficiency. At issue, as with inflation uncertainty,
is whether real growth variability is empirically
related to inflation in low-to-moderate inflation
countries. The empirical results presented in this
section show a positive and statistically significant
long-run relationship between inflation and the
variability of real output growth for these countries.
Why is highly variable real output growth
costly?
An important goal of policymakers is to help
ensure the economy produces goods and services
at its full potential. Potential output is what an
economy produces when labor and capital are
fully employed. When an economy operates below
potential, consumer welfare is reduced as unem-
ployment rises above the full employment rate
and capital is underutilized. Conversely, when
the economy operates above potential, labor
shortages put upward pressure on wages and
prices, causing inflation to rise and consumer
welfare to fall. Moreover, to the extent that labor
shortages lead to longer working hours and
greater strains on capital equipment, production
efficiency may decline.
As the variability of real output growth rises,
the economy is less likely to produce at its full
potential. When an economy is producing at full
potentialthat is, actual real output equals poten-
tial outputit will continue to operate at potential
only if actual output grows at the same rate as
potential. But if actual real output grows faster
than potential, it will raise inflationary pressures,
while if real output grows slower it will raise unem-
ployment. Because potential output tends to grow
steadily, actual real output will deviate from poten-
tial more often if real growth is highly variable. 
Greater variability of real growth due to higher
inflation is costly because it reduces consumer
welfare and economic efficiency. Consumer wel-
fare and production efficiency will fall because
the economy will more often operate either above
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or below potential output. In addition, since
greater output fluctuations affect the availability
of goods and services, consumer welfare will be
further reduced. Finally, because labor and capi-
tal markets are subjected to the fits and starts of
increased output fluctuations, productive effi-
ciency will also fall.
Higher inflation might lead to greater variabil-
ity of real growth for the same reasons that it
leads to greater inflation uncertainty. As dis-
cussed earlier, policymakers may not be commit-
ted to low inflation and therefore might follow
monetary policy procedures that lead to both
higher inflation and highly variable policy ac-
tions. Since changes in monetary policy affect
real output in the short run, more variable policy
actions might cause real output growth to be-
come more variable when inflation rises.8
Empirical results
Only a few studies have investigated the rela-
tionship between inflation and the variability of
real output growth. While these studies have
found a positive relationship, they are either
outdated or focus on industrial production,
which is a fairly narrow measure of real output.9
This analysis uses more recent data, a broader
measure of real output, and a larger cross section
of countries to show that inflation is positively
related to real growth variability in the long run.
The positive relationship between inflation
and real growth variability is shown in Chart 2.
The horizontal axis shows the same average infla-
tion rates used in Chart 1. The variability of real
growth for each country is measured on the
vertical axis by the standard deviation of per
capita real GDP growth.10 The solid line repre-
sents the regression of real growth variability on
inflation. The correlation coefficient for the whole
sample (top panel) is 0.33 and is statistically
significant at the 2.6 percent level. The positive
relationship between inflation and real growth
variability for the sample of 21 OECD countries
(bottom panel) is almost twice as strong-the
correlation coefficient is 0.60 and is statistically
significant at the 0.4 percent level. The regression
lines on the two charts indicate that, on average,
a one percentage point increase in inflation is
associated with 0.24 percentage point increase in
real growth variability for the whole sample, and
a 0.19 percentage point increase in real growth
variability for the OECD countries.
DOES RELATIVE PRICE VOLATILITY
RISE WITH INFLATION? 
A third potential consequence of inflation is
that relative prices might become more volatile.
The relative price of a good is its price relative to
the price of another good or, more typically, to
the price of a basket of goods such as the CPI.
While some relative price variability is necessary
for a market economy to function efficiently,
excessive relative price volatility can reduce eco-
nomic efficiency, making consumers and busi-
nesses worse off. This section discusses the costs
of excessive relative price volatility and shows
that countries with moderate long-run inflation
rates have greater relative price volatility than
countries with low long-run inflation rates.
Why is excessive relative price volatility costly?
In a market economy, relative prices are the key
variables used by consumers and businesses to
determine what and how much to consume and
produce. The demand for oranges, for example,
depends on the relative price of oranges. If the
price of oranges rises relative to, say, the price of
apples, consumers will demand fewer oranges
and more apples. But if the prices of apples and
everything else goes up by the same percentage as
oranges, so that relative prices do not change,
consumers will demand the same amount of
oranges as before. Similarly, businesses choose
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INFLATION AND REAL GROWTH VARIABILITY
Chart 2
Source:  Authors calculations from Summers and Heston (1991) and the International Financial Statistics.
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the relative amounts of labor and machinery to
use according to the relative prices of labor and
capital-the cheaper labor is relative to capital,
the more labor that a business will use in its
production process.
A market economy produces the optimal
amount of goods and services if relative prices
are determined by fundamental demand and
supply. The demand for oranges, for example,
indicates how many oranges a person wants to
buy given the relative pricethe higher the price,
the lower the demand. When the relative price is
determined solely by demand and supply, the
amount of oranges that people want to consume
will equal the amount produced. Because con-
sumers get exactly what they desire, the amount
of oranges consumed and produced is optimal.
For relative prices to depend solely on demand
and supply conditions, relative prices must change
when demand and supply conditions change.
Suppose a hard freeze in Florida kills a large share
of the seasons orange crop, reducing the supply
of oranges. At the initial price, consumers will
demand more oranges than are available, creating
a shortage. The shortage, in turn, will put upward
pressure on the relative price, causing consumers
to switch from oranges to other types of fruit.
The price of oranges will continue to rise until it
reaches a level at which the amount of oranges
that consumers want to buy equals the smaller
supply. At this higher price, the amount of oranges
consumed equals what is available and is, once
again, optimal. Thus, for the price system to work
best, relative prices must respond to changes in
demand and supply.
But excessive changes in relative prices unre-
lated to changes in demand and supply are costly
to the economy because they lead people to make
decisions that are inconsistent with their funda-
mental desires. Suppose the government taxes
oranges but not other types of fruit. In the short
run, people will demand fewer oranges and more
apples, creating an orange surplus and an apple
shortage. Over time, orange production will sub-
side and apple production will rise until a bal-
ance is reached between the demand for, and
supply of, each type of fruit. In this case, however,
people are not consuming the amount of oranges
or apples based on their fundamental demands.
In general, any policy that obscures the true
relative price of goods and services reduces con-
sumer welfare because it leads people to make
choices that are not in accord with their interests.
Moreover, to the extent the relative prices of
labor and capital are altered, real output will be
lower because businesses will choose less efficient
methods of production.11
Inflation is potentially a main source of exces-
sive changes in relative prices that are unrelated
to fundamental changes in demand and supply.
One reason inflation might lead to excessive
relative price variability is that it is costly to
change prices often (Fischer 1981). For example,
restaurants do not change their prices daily
because it is costly to reprint menus. When
inflation rises, according to this menu cost
view, a business will raise prices only if the
increase in its costs reduces profits by enough to
make the effort worthwhile. Since the cost of
changing prices varies across industries, some
businesses will change their prices for a given
increase in inflation while others will not. As a
result, as long as an increase in inflation leads
firms to reset prices in a staggered or nonsyn-
chronized pattern, an increase in inflation will
lead to excessive changes in relative prices.12
Empirical results
Many studies have examined the relationship
between inflation and relative price volatility,
and most have found a positive relationship
(Golob 1993). The implications of these studies
for industrialized countries with low to moderate
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inflation are limited, however, because the focus
has generally been on high inflation countries
and on the short-run impact of inflation instead
of the long-run impact.13 This section focuses on
the long-term impact of low to moderate infla-
tion on relative price volatility by using data
averaged over long periods of time for several
OECD countries. The results indicate that rela-
tive price volatility is higher in moderate infla-
tion countries than in low inflation countries.
The data on relative price variability are con-
structed from the OECD Sectoral Data Base
(Meyer zu Schlochtern and Meyer zu Schlo-
chtern). This data set contains measures of nomi-
nal and real output from several sectors for 14
OECD countries.14 The availability of data by
sector varies across countries, however, creating
a necessary tradeoff between the number of coun-
tries and the number of sectors that can be
included in the measure of relative price volatil-
ity. In other words, increasing the number of
sectors included in the measure of relative price
volatility requires reducing the number of coun-
tries that can be used. Because of this tradeoff,
two data sets are used to examine the relationship
between inflation and relative price volatility.
The first data set (Group A) uses 13 of the 14
countries but includes only six sectors. The sec-
ond data set (Group B) uses seven countries and
includes 14 sectors (appendix).15
Chart 3 shows the long-run relationship be-
tween inflation and relative price volatility for
INFLATION AND RELATIVE PRICE VOLATILITY
(Group A)
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the 13 countries in Group A. As in the previous
charts, inflation is measured along the horizontal
axis by the annual average growth rate of the
CPI.16 The time period over which inflation is
averaged varies across countries from 20 to 32
years depending on the availability of sectoral
output data. The average inflation rates vary from
a low of 3.4 percent in West Germany to a high
of 10.7 percent in Italy. On the vertical axis,
relative price volatility for each country is mea-
sured by taking the standard deviation of relative
inflation across sectors in each year and then
averaging the results over the available sample
period.17  The standard deviation of relative in-
flation measures the typical deviation of the
individual sectoral inflation rates from the aver-
age inflation rate across sectors. For example,
Italys average standard deviation of relative in-
flation over the whole sample is 1.6 percent,
which indicates that the typical sectors inflation
rate differed from the average inflation rate by
1.6 percentage points. 
The chart shows that the long-run relationship
between inflation and relative price volatility for
the Group A countries is positive and strong. The
correlation coefficient is 0.63 and is statistically
significant-the probability that there is no cor-
relation is just 2 percent (Table 1). Moreover, the
relationship between inflation and relative price
volatility is not only statistically significant but
also economically significant for these relatively
low inflation countries. The solid line on Chart
3, which represents the regression of relative price
Table 1
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INFLATION AND RELATIVE PRICE VOLATILITY
Sample period
Whole sample
Whole sample
(Exc. 1973
and 1979) 1970-80 1981-91
Pooled
(Cols. 3 and 4)
Group A .63 .67 .53 .67 .74
(2) (1) (6) (1) (0)
Group B .61 .68 .51 .64 .68
(15) (9) (25) (12) (1)
Notes: This table shows the correlation between inflation and relative price volatility over several sample periods for two
groups of countries (p-values times 100 are in parentheses). Inflation is measured by the annual growth rate of the Con-
sumer Price Index (CPI) averaged over the sample period. Relative price volatility is measured by the standard deviation of
relative inflation across sectors averaged over the sample period (see endnote 17 for details on the construction of the mea-
sure of relative price volatility). The CPI data are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) tapes, and the relative
price data were constructed by the authors from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Sectoral Data Base (Meyer zu Schlochtern and Meyer zu Schlochtern). Group A consists of 13 countries and six sectors,
and group B consists of seven countries and 14 sectors (appendix). The results in column 2 are from data averaged over all
of the available sample years excluding the oil price shock years of 1973 and 1979. The pooled results come from combin-
ing the observations averaged over the years from 1970 to 1980 (column 3) and the observations averaged over the years
from 1981 to 1991 (column 4).
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volatility on inflation, indicates that, on average,
a one percentage point increase in inflation is
associated with a 0.09 percentage point increase
in relative price volatility. Thus, for example, a
reduction in Italys inflation rate from 10.7 percent
to West Germanys 3.4 percent would be associ-
ated with about a 40 percent decline in Italys
relative price volatility (0.09 percentage point
times the 7.3 percent decline in inflation divided
by Italys relative price volatility of 1.6 percent).
Using more sectors to compute relative price
volatility does not qualitatively change the results
(Chart 4). The correlation coefficient for the
Group B countries is 0.61, about the same as for
Group A, although it is not statistically signifi-
cant at conventional significance levels (Table 1).
The lack of significance is not totally unexpected,
however, because there are only seven countries.
A potential problem with interpreting the cor-
relations between inflation and relative price
volatility is whether inflation leads to greater
relative price volatility or relative price volatility
leads to greater inflation. For example, relative
price shocks, such as the sharp increases in oil
prices in 1973 and 1979, can lead to temporary
increases in inflation. To see whether the results
are due to such relative price shocks, the correla-
tions were recalculated after excluding data from
1973 and 1979 (Table 1). The second column of
the table shows that excluding the years of the oil
price shocks actually increases the correlations
slightly. In fact, the correlation for Group B
Source:  Authors calculations from Meyer zu Schlochtern and Meyer zu Schlochtern (1994) and International Financial Statistics.
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INFLATION AND RELATIVE PRICE VOLATILITY
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Table 2
CORRELATION BETWEEN INFLATION AND RELATIVE PRICE VOLATILITY
(by country)
Country Group A Group B
Australia .35
(11)
Belgium .64
(0)
Canada .25 .41
(8) (3)
Denmark -.09 -.29
(67) (17)
Finland .46 .54
(1) (0)
France -.11 .41
(65) (7)
Italy .44
(4)
Japan .70
(0)
Norway .26
(18)
Sweden .04 .19
(87) (4)
United Kingdom .09
(67)
United States .29 .53
(3) (0)
West Germany .27 .31
(19) (12)
Pooled correlation .30 .39
(0) (0)
Notes: This table shows the correlation between inflation and relative price volatility using annual time series data for each
country (p-values times 100 are in parentheses). Definitions of the variables and data sources are in the notes to Table 1.
The correlations are partial correlations calculated from a regression of relative price volatility on inflation, an oil price
dummy for 1973 and 1979 representing the oil price shocks, and the oil price dummy interacted with inflation. The U.S.
regressions also include a price control dummy that equals 1 in 1971 and 1972 and -1 in 1973 and 1974. The correlation
for the row labeled Pooled correlation is from a regression that combines all of the data and that includes an intercept
dummy for every country except the United States. The data are annual observations, and the number of observations for
the individual countries varies from 20 to 32. The pooled regressions included 330 observations for Group A and 193 ob-
servations for Group B. For all regressions, the last observation was in either 1990, 1991, or 1992.
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becomes statistically significant at less than the
10 percent level.
Another way to check the sensitivity of the
results to the oil shock years is to see whether the
correlations differ between the 1970s and the
1980s (Chart 5 and Table 1). The charts and table
indicate that the positive relationship is stronger
in the 1980s than in the 1970s, suggesting that
the results are not due to the effect of oil prices
on inflation. The top panel of Chart 5 shows the
Group A data averaged over the years from 1970
to 1980, while the bottom panel shows the data
averaged over the years from 1981 to 1991. Col-
umns 3 and 4 of Table 1 show the corresponding
correlations. Both panels of the chart show a
positive relationship between inflation and rela-
tive price volatility, with the primary difference
being that inflation and relative price volatility
were uniformly higher in the 1970s than in the
1980s. In addition, the data in the 1980s chart
are less dispersed around the regression line,
indicating a tighter relationship. This tighter
relationship is confirmed in the table-the corre-
lation coefficient for the 1980s is higher and
more significant than the correlation coefficient
for the 1970s. Finally, if the 1970s and 1980s data
are combined, the correlation coefficient is 0.74
and is statistically significant at less than the 0.1
percent level (Table 1, Column 5). Dividing the
Group B data between the 1970s and 1980s
produces results almost identical to the Group A
results (Table 1). Thus, the positive relationship
between inflation and relative price variability
does not appear to be due to relative price shocks
leading to greater inflation.
The analysis in this section has focused on the
long-run relationship between inflation and rela-
tive price volatility by using the cross-country
data. As a final check on the robustness of the
results, it is useful to see whether the relationship
between inflation and relative price volatility
over time is consistent with the cross-section
results and the results of previous studies. As
shown in Table 2, the correlation over time
between inflation and relative price volatility is
positive for most countries. The correlations for
each country are partial correlations that control
for the oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979.18 For
Group A, Denmark and France are the only
countries with negative correlations, but the cor-
relations are far from conventional levels of
statistical significance. Among the other 11 coun-
tries with positive correlations, the correlations
are significantly different from zero at less than
the 10 percent level for six countries-Belgium,
Canada, Finland, Italy, Japan, and the United
States. For Group B, Canada, Finland, France,
Sweden, and the United States have significantly
positive correlations. When the data for each
group are combined into a single regression, the
correlation coefficient for each group is positive
and highly significant. Thus, the time series data
appear to be consistent with both the cross-
section results presented here and the results of
previous studies.
CONCLUSIONS
Long-run price stability is an important goal
of policymakers in many countries. Because anti-
inflationary policies are costly in the short run,
though, it is useful to ask whether there are any
costs of allowing even low inflation to rise. This
article has identified three potential consequences
of inflation-inflation uncertainty, real growth
variability, and relative price volatility. The article
argues that these consequences are harmful to the
economy because they reduce economic efficiency
and therefore the level of economic outputand
consumer welfare. Using long-run data from
countries with low to moderate inflation, the
article shows that rising inflation is associated
with greater inflation uncertainty, real growth
variability, and relative price volatility. These
results suggest there are long-run benefits to keep-
ing inflation from rising from even low levels.
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APPENDIX
COMPOSITION OF GROUPS
Group A
Countries Sectors
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Italy
Japan
Norway
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
West Germany
Agriculture
Construction
Manufacturing
Services (community, social, and 
personal)
Transportation (transport, storage, 
and communications)
Utilities (electricity, gas, and water)
Group B
Countries Sectors
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Sweden
United States
West Germany
Agriculture
Basic metal products
Chemicals
Construction
Food (food, beverages, and tobacco)
Machinery and equipment
Nonmetallic mineral products
Other manufactured products
Paper (paper, printing, and 
publishing)
Services (community, social, and 
personal)
Textiles
Transportation (transport, storage, 
and communications)
Utilities (electricity, gas, and water)
Wood and wood products
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ENDNOTES
1 Golob discusses in greater detail the costs of inflation
uncertainty (1994) and why inflation uncertainty might rise
with inflation (1993, 1994).
2 Campbell estimates that the inflation risk premium ranges
from -0.25 to 1.25 percentage points. Shen argues that the
inflation risk premium can be negative because bond issuers
might be compensated for their exposure to inflation risk
by paying a lower rate on their bonds. The sign on the risk
premium depends on whether issuers or investors are more
risk aversespecifically, if issuers are more risk averse, then
the inflation risk premium may be negative. 
3 This argument was first recognized by Milton Friedman
(p. 466) in his Nobel prize acceptance speech: A burst of
inflation produces strong pressure to counter it. Policy goes
from one direction to the other, encouraging wide variation
in the actual and anticipated rate of inflation. And, of
course, in such an environment, no one has single-valued
anticipations. Everyone recognizes that there is great
uncertainty about what actual inflation will turn out to be
over any specific future interval.
4 The countries in the sample are the same as those used in
the next section to examine the relationship between
inflation and the variability of real growth. The real output
data in that sample are from the Penn World Table Mark 5.6
data set constructed by Summers and Heston. A country was
included if (1) its data were at least C quality as determined
by Summers and Heston, (2) it was not an outlier in Clarks
study of the relationship between inflation and per capita
real GDP growth, (3) it had at least 25 years of inflation data
beginning after 1959, and (4) its average annual inflation
rate over the sample was no greater than 15 percent. The
countries excluded for reasons other than data quality, with
the reason for exclusion in parentheses, are Morocco (2),
Tanzania (4), Tunisia (3), Jamaica (2), Mexico (2),
Colombia (2), Ecuador (4), Hong Kong (2), India (2),
Indonesia (2), South Korea (2), Iceland (2), and Turkey (2).
The countries in the sample are Austria, Australia,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Ireland,
Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, Malaysia,
Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Senegal,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, United
Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, West Germany, and
Zimbabwe.
5 Annual inflation data were available for the whole sample
for 42 of the 47 countries. The smallest sample was 25 years.
The data are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
data base. 
6 Golob (1993, 1994) provides a detailed discussion of
alternative measures of inflation uncertainty. Some studies
use surveys of consumers and economists. Other studies
measure inflation uncertainty using econometric models
that forecast inflation. A third measure is simply the
variability of actual inflation, measured by the variance or
standard deviation of inflation over time. This measure
implicitly assumes that expected inflation is the average
inflation rate over the period of time under study.
Because this article focuses on a broad group of countries,
the only feasible measure of inflation uncertainty is the
standard deviation of inflation. The sample used here
consists of 47 countries, less than half of which are
industrialized. As a result, inflation surveys are available for
very few of the sample countries. In addition, not only is it
infeasible to estimate econometric inflation models for so
many countries, but also data are not available to do so for
many of the countries.
7 The OECD sample excludes Iceland, Luxembourg, and
Turkey. Iceland and Luxembourg are often excluded from
long-run studies of OECD countries because of the small
size of their economies. Iceland also had a 21 percent average
annual inflation rate over the sample. Turkey was excluded
because its average annual inflation rate over the sample was
24 percent.
8 More formally, a positive relationship between inflation
and real output variability can be derived from a Lucas
supply curve, which links deviations in real output from
potential to unexpected changes in inflation. The Lucas
supply curve can be written as
(yt − yt∗) = γ (pit − pite ), γ > 0,
where y is real output, y* is potential output, pi is inflation,
and pie is expected inflation. Given this equation, the
variance of real output would be positively related to the
variance of inflation. If the variance of inflation is used to
measure inflation uncertainty, then higher levels of
inflation could lead to greater real output variability
through inflation uncertainty.
9 Logue and Sweeney find that CPI inflation is positively
related to real growth variability in the long run using data
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averaged over the period from 1950 to 1971 for the 24
OECD countries. Katsimbris finds a positive relationship
for 6 of the 18 OECD countries that he studies using time
series data from 1955 to 1983. Katsimbris only explores the
short-run relationship between inflation and real growth
variability due to the time series methodology that he uses.
10 Per capita real GDP is calculated as real GDP (chain
weighted) divided by population using the Penn World
Table Mark 5.6 data set constructed by Summers and
Heston. See endnote 4 for the criteria used to choose the
countries included in the data set.
11 The costs of unwarranted changes in relative prices are
exacerbated to the extent individuals enter into long-term
relationships using current relative prices as indicators of
future prices (Ball and Romer; Tommassi). When relative
prices change for reasons unrelated to fundamental
demands and supplies, current prices become less
informative about future prices. Accordingly, unwarranted
changes in relative prices cause customers involved in
long-term relationships to either accept the higher prices or
incur the costs of searching for a new supplier.
12 Golob (1993) provides a more detailed discussion of why
inflation might cause greater relative price volatility.
13 The short-run focus of previous studies is due to the time
series methodologies that they use. Glejser uses cross-country
data to analyze whether inflation leads to greater relative
price volatility, but his study uses data only through 1958.
14 Summing the output across sectors does not equal total
GDP because the data base does not include all sectors of
the economy. The number of years for which sectoral output
data are available varies across countries from 20 (1971 to
1990 for Belgium) to 32 (1961 to 1992 for Finland). The
samples are fairly current-every country has data through
either 1990, 1991, or 1992.
15 The Netherlands is excluded from the sample because
data were not available for too many sectors. 
16 The CPI inflation data are the same IFS data used in the
previous charts and are not from the OECD Sectoral Data
Base.
17 Specifically, relative price volatility for each country is
measured by the weighted standard deviation
SDt =   ∑wi,t
i=1
n
 (pii,t − pit) 2  1⁄  2 
pit = ∑wi,t
i=1
n
 pii,t ,
where pii,t is the inflation rate in the ith sector at time t, wi,t
is the weight for the ith sector at time t, and n is the number
of sectors (Parks). The weight for the ith sector at time t, wi,t,
is the ratio of real output in the ith sector at time t to the
sum of the sectoral real outputs at time t. Note that the
weights sum to 1 at each point in time. The inflation rate
for each sector is calculated by first creating the implicit
deflator for each sector as the ratio of nominal to real
output, and then differencing the logs of the implicit
deflators. Note that the aggregate inflation rate, pit, is a
Divisia aggregate-it is the weighted sum of the inflation
rates for each sector-and is not the CPI or GDP deflator.
In addition, the aggregate inflation rate for a given country
differs for Group A and Group B because the number of
sectors differ.
18 The correlations are partial correlations calculated from
a regression of relative price volatility on inflation, an oil
price dummy for 1973 and 1979 representing the oil price
shocks, and the oil price dummy interacted with inflation.
The U.S. regressions also include a price control dummy
that equals 1 in 1971 and 1972 and -1 in 1973 and 1974. The
correlation for the row labeled Pooled correlation is from
a regression that combines all of the data and that includes
an intercept dummy for every country except the United
States. The data are annual observations, and the number of
observations for the individual countries varies from 20 to
32. The pooled regressions included 330 observations for
Group A and 193 observations for Group B. For all
regressions, the last observation was in either 1990, 1991, or
1992.
[         ]
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